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Abstract 
The full scope of enactivist approaches to cognition includes not only a focus 
on sensory-motor contingencies and physical affordances for action, but also 
an  emphasis  on  affective  factors  of  embodiment  and  intersubjective  af-
fordances for social interaction. This strong conception of embodied cognition 
calls for a new way to think about the role of the brain in the larger system of 
brain-body-environment. We ask whether recent work on predictive coding 
offers a way to think about brain function in an enactive system, and we sug-
gest  that a  positive  answer  is  possible  if  we  interpret  predictive  coding  in 
a more enactive way, i.e., as involved in the organism’s dynamic adjustments 
to its environment.  
Keywords: enactivism; sensory-motor contingencies; affect; intersubjectivity; 
predictive coding. 
Enactivism is one version of recently developed embodied approaches to cog-
nition. It offers an approach that is more informed by phenomenology and 
pragmatism than other versions of embodied cognition, such as the extended 
mind  hypothesis  (Clark  2008;  Clark  and  Chalmers  1998),  and  more  radical 
than  the  kind  of  “moderate”  (Goldman  2012)  or  “weak”  (Alsmith  and 
Vignemont 2012) embodied cognition found in theorists who locate the body 
“in the brain” or who translate all bodily action into body-formatted represen-
tations (e.g., Berlucci and Aglioti 2010; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2012; Goldman 
and  Vignemont  2010).  Enactivists  have  entered  into  various  debates  with 
these other approaches (see Di Paulo 2009; Gallagher 2011a; Thompson 2007), 
and clear lines have been drawn to distinguish the differences that involve 
questions about functionalism, the importance of the body, the way one is 
coupled to the environment, and so forth. At the same time, however, there 
are a number of differences to be found within the enactive camp itself, so 
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that the “early” enactivism of Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), closely con-
tinued by De Jaegher and Di Paulo (2007) is not exactly the same as the “mid-
dle’ enactivism of O’Regan and Noë (2001; Noë 2004), or the “latest enactivism” 
of Hutto and Myin (2013). There are some obvious differences among these 
authors simply in terms of pedigree: Varela et al. are strongly influenced by 
phenomenology (as well as Buddhism), O’Regan and Noë by cognitive science, 
and Hutto and Myin by analytic philosophy of mind. While enactivists should 
be pleased with these convergences of disciplines and traditions, we’re going 
to suggest that they should also be critical with respect to the question about 
how embodied enactivism is. 
To pose this critical question we want to focus on the work of those enactivists 
who emphasize the role played by sensorimotor contingencies in perception, 
especially O’Regan and Noë. While this is clearly an embodied approach to 
cognition, we want to argue that it is not as richly embodied as it should be. 
One  starts  to  see  this  in  some  recent  authors  who  have  distinguished  the 
O’Regan and Noë brand of enactivism as the ‘sensorimotor approach’ in con-
trast to the enactive approach (see, e.g., Kyselo and Di Paolo 2013; also Staple-
ton 2013). The focus on sensorimotor contingencies emphasizes a narrow con-
ception of embodiment in terms of neuro-muscular function. In contrast to 
this narrow focus, we want to suggest that these versions of sensorimotor en-
activism need to be made more embodied. We’ll focus on three issues: (1) af-
fectivity; (2) intersubjectivity; and (3) a dynamic attunement theory of brain 
function. Emphasis on these issues is consistent with the enactivism associat-
ed with Varela, Thompson, and Di Paolo, and offers a positive account of enac-
tivism that goes beyond the incisive critique of representationalism offered by 
Hutto and Myin. We also note that although the sensory-motor contingency 
approach focused on perception, the enactivist project concerns more than 
just perception. That is, the project is to develop an account of cognition more 
generally,  including  perceptual  judgments  and  higher-order  cognitive  pro-
cesses such as deliberation, decision, memory, and so forth. 
Our goal is to make clear that these issues are important ones for continuing 
development of the enactivist approach. Elsewhere we have developed some 
critical  considerations  with respect  to  the  first  two  issues  (Bower and  Gal-
lagher 2013). We’ll briefly rehearse these considerations in the next two sec-
tions. We’ll then focus on the third, and argue that to have a more embodied 
enactivism we need a different understanding of how the brain works. Specif-
ically we want to explore recent predictive coding models from an enactivist 
perspective. In this regard we generalize suggestions about the “interactive 
brain hypothesis” made by Di Paolo and De Jaegher (2012).  
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Affectivity 
An enactive account of cognition and perception integrates a variety of bodily 
factors into cognitive processes. The body, understood as what phenomenolo-
gists call the “lived body,” includes the related notion of a “body schema” (Gal-
lagher 2005). The role of the body schema pertains to motor control and pre-
cisely the kind of sensory-motor contingencies emphasized by O’Regan and 
Noë (2001) and Noë (2004); it facilitates interactions with one’s surroundings, 
and it contrasts to the “body image,” a term that designates the ways in which 
the body shows up for consciousness, in certain circumstances, as its inten-
tional referent.  
The lived body in its full sense, however, involves more than the sensorimotor 
body schema and body image. It involves the full ensemble of bodily factors 
that govern conscious life, but that operate in a pre-noetic fashion, below the 
level of conscious monitoring and manipulation. Such factors may or may not 
be accessible to conscious awareness. They include the large realm of affect. 
This rich affective set of bodily factors is partially constitutive of perception in 
ways  that  go  beyond  sensorimotor  contingencies.  An  account  that  focuses 
only on sensorimotor contingencies falls short due to its neglect of the rele-
vance of the affective aspects including proprioceptive and kinaesthetic as-
pects—factors that should be of high interest since they derive from move-
ment and contribute to one’s practical grasp of sensorimotor contingencies. 
Affective  factors,  however,  also  involve  a  complex  motivational  dimension 
that animates body-world interaction (Bower and Gallagher 2013; Stapleton 
2013; Colombetti 2013).  
Meaningful encounters with the world imply a perceiving agent with some 
basic motivation to perceptually engage her surroundings. Schemata of sen-
sorimotor  contingencies  give  an  agent  the  how  of  perception,  a  tacit 
knowledge  of  potential  sensorimotor  engagements,  without  giving  its  why, 
which depends on latent valences that push or pull in one direction or anoth-
er for attention and for potential sensory-motor engagement, reflecting, for 
example, a degree of desirability. “The endogenously originating motivational 
viscera of the body are just as important to perception as the exogenously 
oriented sensory-motor elements” (Bower and Gallagher 2013: 111). 
Affects  are  not restricted  to  the  domain  of  phenomenal  consciousness, alt-
hough they may certainly have an effect on what experience feels like. I may 
consciously  experience  the  blues,  or  I may  be  unaware  that my  whole de-
meanor reflects the blues. Affect is deeply embodied even to the extent that 
affective phenomena may be constrained by the functioning of the circulatory 
system.  For  example,  heartbeat  influences  how  and  whether  fear-inducing 
stimuli (images of fearful faces, in the reported experiments) are processed 
(Garfinkel et al. 2013). When the heart contracts in its systole phase, fearful 
stimuli are more easily recognized, and they tend to be perceived as more AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
235 
 
fearful than when presented in its diastole phase. That is, the fact that, rather 
than brains in vats, we are flesh and blood creatures equipped with beating 
hearts,  explains  in part  why we  have  just  the  sorts  of  affective  states  that 
we do. 
Consider particular instances of the affects involved in hunger and fatigue. 
Somaesthetic factors such as hunger delimit our perception and action possi-
bilities, as well as our cognitive possibilities. William James once noted that an 
apple appears larger and more invitingly red when one is hungry than when 
one is satiated. A recent study (Danziger et al. 2011) reinforced the idea that 
hunger can shape, and perhaps even distort, cognitive judgment processes. 
The study shows that the rational application of legal reasons does not suffi-
ciently explain the decisions of judges. Whether the judge is hungry or satiat-
ed may play an important role.  
The percentage of favorable rulings drops gradually from ≈65% to nearly zero 
within each decision session [e.g., between breakfast and lunch] and returns 
abruptly to ≈65% after a [food] break. Our findings suggest that judicial rulings 
can be swayed by extraneous variables that should have no bearing on legal 
decisions. (Danziger et al. 2011: 1).  
In one sense, such affective factors appear “extraneous” only if we try to think 
of cognition as something that is disembodied, although clearly they may be 
extraneous to the formal aspects of legal reasoning. In any case, it seems rea-
sonable to think that this embodied affective aspect of hunger has an effect on 
the jurist’s perception of the facts, as well as on the weighing of evidence, and 
doesn’t appear out of nowhere just when the judicial decision is made.  
Typically our embodied condition does not reflect a simple, isolated affect—
rather, there is a cocktail, a mélange of aspects that make up one’s affective 
state. After  a  day  of trekking up  a mountain,  one’s  perception  may  be  in-
formed by a combination of hunger, pain, fatigue, troubled respiration, feel-
ings of dirtiness, and the kinaesthetic difficulty involved in climbing. It’s likely 
that that the mountain path looks more different and less challenging than 
after a good night’s sleep, not because of certain objective qualities that belong 
to the path, but because of my affective state. Such affective aspects color my 
perception as they more generally constrain my being-in-the-world.  
Affective phenomena are pervasively integrated into our perceptual and cog-
nitive experiences (Pessoa 2013; Barrett and Bliss-Moreau 2009), as noted by 
many enactivists (Colombetti 2007; Ellis 2005; Thompson 2007; Thompson and 
Stapleton 2009). Shifts of attention may be led in one direction or another by 
the affective ebb and flow of what we experience. From a phenomenological 
perspective Husserl (2004) describes such affective states involving tension, 
resolution, exertion, unease, and satisfaction/dissatisfaction as modulating our 
perceptual (but not only perceptual) attention. Attention, in this sense, is em-
bodied in a variety of related ways. In visual experience, for example, attend-Making enactivism even more embodied 
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ing to something may involve squinting or opening the eyes widely, it may 
involve a contortion of the face all the way from the scalp down to a gaping 
mouth or pursed lips, and so on (Bergson 2001: 27-28). 
Affect is closely related to the phenomenon of perceptual presence elaborated 
by Noë (2004), and specifically involves a sense of interest or investment. Per-
ceptual presence is the sense one has of the perceptual accessibility of non-
apparent aspects or sides of a perceived object, or, more broadly, of what is 
not directly sensed in the present moment (e.g., the side of the object that is 
not visible). The notion of “perceptual interest” (Bower and Gallagher 2013) 
denotes the affective sense of the stakes or the costs involved in exchanges 
with  one’s  environment.  This  is  not  the  same  as  Husserl’s  concept  of  the 
“I can,” which signifies the intuitive possession of a sense of skill or compe-
tence.  Rather,  even  if  one  is  capable  of  accomplishing  some  feat  in  those 
terms, one might still not feel “up to the task,” or not feel inclined to do the 
work it might take, which is the affective nuance the sense of interest is sup-
posed to highlight. Thus, interwoven with that perceptual sense of presence is 
a sense of the affective stakes of making something available or present. To 
make  something  available  involves  definite  costs  in  following  through  on 
transactions  with  environmental  affordances.  One’s  environment  affords 
many possibilities for action, but each has its affective price tag, and they are 
not all equally affordable. One thus not only has a practical (sensorimotor) 
understanding of accessibility, but an affective take on that same accessibility, 
in terms of interest or inclination to follow through. The latter may also in-
volve a perceptual sense of the ease or difficulty of making something present.  
It’s true that a perceiving agent’s perceptual stance is determined by a mas-
tery  of  sensorimotor  contingencies  needed  to  access  environmental  af-
fordances in suitable ways. Such mastery, however, once acquired, may be 
a relative constant, and more or less generic or standard set of skills suitable 
for most transactions with the world. Anyone with that same skill set might 
perceive in the same way. In contrast, the particularities of affect will differ 
from one individual to another, or from one day to another. Taking affective 
phenomena into account importantly enriches one’s understanding of percep-
tion,  since  it  clarifies  the  nature  of  individual  perspective  in  perception. 
A broad spectrum of individual life circumstances may, in terms of affect, be 
brought to bear on perception, as well as other forms of cognition. These cir-
cumstances include not only physical burdens and impediments, such as the 
impediment of fatigue from physical exertion, but also broader circumstances 
having to do with time of day, since one typically is energized at the start of 
the day and tired out toward the end, or with longer-term life phases, since 
youth and old age surely shape one’s perceptual interest.  
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While everyone is affected by such circumstances in one way or another, each 
individual lives them out in a unique way. The sense of the presence of the 
other side of an object, of what is behind one, of what is in an adjoining room, 
and the like, touches—over and above one’s generic strategies for bodily cop-
ing with the environment—one’s individual condition with all of its strengths 
and weaknesses. In a very simple example, what Noë calls the ‘grabbiness” of 
an object is dependent not only on one’s sense of the pertinent sensorimotor 
contingencies,  whether  the  object  is  near  or far,  and  properly  shaped and 
weighted, etc., and not only on whether one is in a state of pain, or fatigue, or 
fear, etc., but on whether one is even concerned about (or inclined to) the pos-
sibility of grabbing the object.  
 
Intersubjectivity 
A series of experiments conducted by Proffitt et al. (1995; Proffitt 2003) pur-
portedly show that the estimation of distance is influenced by anticipated ef-
fort. Subjects saddled with a heavy backpack tend to overestimate perceived 
distance, whereas those without backpacks do not. Proffitt et al. (1995) simi-
larly describe how subjects overestimate the degree of incline of a slope when 
fatigued, and this may translate into the subject’s lack of inclination (to climb), 
which further informs perception. The hill looks not only steeper, but also 
uninviting. This might count as at least indirect evidence that perceptual ex-
perience and/or judgment is informed by one’s present affective state. These 
results, however, have been challenged by Durgin et al. (2009), in a way that 
nicely points in a different, but equally important direction for our considera-
tions here. They show that steeper estimates of incline while wearing a back-
pack “are judgmental biases that result from the social, not physical, demands 
of the experimental context” (p. 1). Without awareness of this bias, subjects 
who sense the aim of the experiment estimate a steeper incline than subjects 
who are misled about the purpose of the backpack (e.g., that it contains elec-
tromyographic equipment to measure muscle tension). In other words, those 
subjects who had a sense of the experimenters’ intentions were biased in fa-
vor of those intentions, without necessarily knowing it.  
If Proffitt is right (see Proffitt 2009; 2013 for further discussion), his experi-
mental  results  could be  taken to  point  to the  embodied-affective  nature  of 
perception. But if Durgin et al. (2009; 2012) are right, their results still point to 
an embodied phenomenon—namely, the significance of others on our percep-
tions and/or judgments.
53  
                                                             
53 We note that there is continuing debate about whether these are effects on perception itself or 
on perceptual judgments, a distinction that can be clearly made in the experimental lab (see Fire-
stone and Scholl 2014 experiments on the El Greco fallacy). This is an important issue in regard to 
claims about cognitive penetration of perception, but for our limited purposes here it is sufficient Making enactivism even more embodied 
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There are several ways to understand intersubjectivity as an embodied phe-
nomenon. For example, some simulation theorists, like Gallese (2001; Gallese 
and Sinigaglia 2012) understand empathic consciousness or social cognition to 
be embodied in at least a weak sense. That is, they understand social cognition 
to depend on body-formatted neural processes, specifically the activation of 
mirror neurons (MNs).
54 A more enactive approach, however, interprets the 
mirror system to be activated in preparation for or anticipation of a response 
to the other. That is, MN activation does not ordinarily involve matching (in 
one’s own system) or imitating the action of the other person (see Catmur et 
al. (2007); Dinstein et al. 2008; Csibra 2005 for empirical evidence; also Gal-
lagher  2008);  it  involves  anticipatory  processes  that  are  keyed  in  with  af-
fordances for further interaction, or preparation for a complementary action 
in  response  to an  observed action (Newman-Norlund  et  al.  2007).  In  other 
words, it is part of a response to social affordances.  
On the enactive view, social cognition is characterized by, and sometimes con-
stituted by embodied interaction (Di Jaegher, Di Paulo and Gallagher 2010). 
This  view  is  usually  worked  out  in  contrast  to  theory  of  mind  (ToM)  ap-
proaches that emphasize mindreading by either theoretical inference or simu-
lation  (Gallagher  2001;  2005;  2008).  Intersubjective  interaction  is  not  about 
mindreading the mental states of others, but about directly perceiving their 
intentions and emotions in their postures, movements, gestures, facial expres-
sions, vocal intonations, etc., as well as in their highly contextualized (by phys-
ical  environment,  social  roles,  culture,  etc.)  actions  (Gallagher  and  Var-
ga 2013).  
One  important  aspect  of  intersubjective  interaction  that  shows  up  even  in 
cases where we are not explicitly interacting with the other, although another 
person is present, is the effect that his or her presence has on learning and 
perception. One can understand this developmentally in regard to how we 
learn what is important. Studies of “natural pedagogy,” where there is explicit 
interaction, show that how the caregiver relates to the child influences what 
the child learns. Natural pedagogy, which involves ostensively directing the 
infant’s attention to some object or event,  
enables  fast  and  efficient  social  learning  of  cognitively  opaque  cultural 
knowledge that would be hard to acquire relying on purely observational learn-
ing mechanisms alone…. [H]uman infants are prepared to be at the receptive 
side of natural pedagogy (i) by being sensitive to ostensive signals that indicate 
that they are being addressed by communication, (ii) by developing referential 
                                                                                                                                                             
that there are such effects on cognition, whether perception, perceptual judgment, memory, etc. 
and specifically in everyday pragmatic environments.  
54  For  the  notion  of  body-formatted  (or  B-formatted)  representations,  see  Goldman  and  de 
Vignemont (2010), and Goldman (2012)  who propose a “moderate” or “weak” (Alsmith and de 
Vignemont 2013) conception of embodied cognition.  AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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expectations in ostensive contexts and (iii) by being biased to interpret ostensive-
referential communication as conveying information that is kind-relevant and 
generalizable. (Csibra and Gergely 2009: 148).  
More generally, it is through our interactions with others that we learn what 
objects are significant or valuable. We learn to understand the world along 
these lines of significance and value, and often objects that fall outside of such 
lines don’t even register. In the same way that expert training hones the per-
ceptual system so that experts are able to perceive things that non-experts fail 
to perceive, in some sense, we all become experts in everyday life through our 
interactions with others.  
Indeed, this intersubjective education of perception and judgment continues 
throughout life. Adult subjects presented with a face looking towards (or away 
from) an object evaluate the object as more (or less) likeable than those ob-
jects that don’t receive much attention from others. If one adds an emotional 
expression to the face and one get’s a stronger effect (Bayliss et al. 2006; 2007). 
Furthermore, seeing another person act with ease (or without ease) toward an 
object will influence observers’ feelings about the object (Hayes et al. 2007).  
Social  interactions,  social  roles and  groupings  also  have  their  influence  on 
how one perceives the world. In a modification of Proffitt’s scenario, imagine 
being exhausted, but the incline is a hill that you are climbing with friends or 
to meet a loved one (Schnall et al 2008). Or, again, think of the affective import 
in situations where one would be seen by others as not up to the task, nega-
tively  impacting  one’s  image.  In  some  social  circumstances  one  may  find 
a particular setting to be of more interest and more attention grabbing than if 
one were with a different group, or alone. 
 
The embodied and enactive brain 
Following the weak embodiment strategy, one might argue that all such ef-
fects of affectivity and intersubjectivity are ultimately processed in the brain, 
so that even the most enactive aspects of perception are reducible to brain 
processes. After all, even if one interprets MNs as part of an enactive system, 
they are neurons located in certain brain areas. Moreover, when we look at 
how the brain works, we need concepts like representation and inference to 
explain it, and these go against strong enactivist claims that tend to be anti-
representationalist and dismissive of the idea of subpersonal inferences. On 
the weak embodiment view (e.g., Goldman 2012), claims about enactive per-
ception, affectivity, and intersubjectivity can all fit neatly into orthodox inter-
nalist accounts.  
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The notion of an enactive system requires conceiving of the brain in a differ-
ent way. In evolutionary terms, the brain does what it does and is the way it 
is, across some scale of variations, because it is part of a living body that has 
hands that can reach and grasp in certain limited ways, and because it has 
eyes structured to focus, and so on. The sensorimotor system is the way it is 
because of the kind of organism the human body is. In addition the organism 
has an autonomic and peripheral nervous systems, and not just a central sys-
tem. It attains an upright posture, which, in evolutionary terms reshapes es-
sential features, including the brain (Gallagher 2005), allowing the person to 
cope with specific kinds of environments, and with other people. Changes to 
any of the bodily, environmental, or intersubjective conditions elicit respons-
es from the organism as a whole. On this view, rather than representing or 
computing  information,  the  brain  is  better  conceived  as  participating  in 
the action. 
The enactive interpretation is not simply a reinterpretation of what happens 
extra-neurally, out in the intersubjective world of action where we anticipate 
and respond to social affordances. An enactive interpretation of the MN sys-
tem,  for  example,  points  beyond  the  orthodox  explanation  of  information 
processing to the possibility of rethinking not just the neural correlates of per-
ception or intersubjectivity, but the very notion of neural correlate, and how 
the brain itself works. More than this, it suggests a different way of conceiving 
brain function, specifically in nonrepresentational, integrative and dynamical 
terms (see, e.g., Gallagher et al. 2013; Hutto & Myin 2013). 
This doesn’t mean that we should simply turn the issue over to neuroscientists 
to adjudicate, or simply consult what the neuroscientists say about subper-
sonal  neural  processes.  Most  neuroscientists  are  Helmholtzian  and  would 
endorse the idea that the neural processes underlying perception are inferen-
tial and representational.
55 Even the Bayesian predictive coding account treats 
perception and object recognition as an inferential process. As Friston puts it, 
predictive coding is “now a widely accepted view of perception that can be 
traced back to Helmholtz's original writings on unconscious inference” (2012: 
248; also see Clark 2013).
56  
It’s obviously important to understand brain dynamics. More generally, we’ve 
known for a long time that anticipatory processes are hugely important for 
perception and action. In neuroscience we have the work of Berthoz (2000), 
                                                             
55 The Helmholtzian idea that perception involves subpersonal inferences  may or may not be 
correct (see Bennett and Hacker 2003; Orlandi 2012; Hutto and Myin 2013). 
56 The unconscious processes  performed  by the brain “are like inferences insofar as from the 
observed effect on our senses we arrive at some conception of the cause of this effect. This is the 
case even though we only in fact have direct access to the events at the nerves; we sense the ef-
fects and never the external objects” (Helmholtz 1867: 430).  AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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for example; and in phenomenology, Husserl’s account of temporal structure 
remains important (1991; Gallagher 1998; 2011b). Work in predictive coding 
provides an account of how neural processing participates in these pervasive 
dynamic anticipatory processes. But again there are questions of how to in-
terpret  what  we  are  learning  about such processes.  The assumption  about 
visual perception, for example, is that the brain has no direct access to the 
outside world, so it needs to interpret or decode neuronal firing patterns that 
are generated by light hitting our retinas. Sensory data “is all the brain has 
access to” (Hohwy 2013, 13). If you think of this in terms of inference then the 
brain is seemingly deducing to the best explanation of what has caused a par-
ticular pattern of neuronal activation and thereby representing that cause via 
a process of causal inference. Since a given pattern could be caused by any 
number  of  different stimulus  configurations,  the  task  involves  figuring  the 
probabilities based on current neural states of the system that may relate, for 
instance, to context. 
How does this Bayesian process work in strict neuronal terms? There is gen-
eral agreement that the process is a hierarchical one involving synaptic inhi-
bition based on an empirical prior—something that depends on the organ-
ism’s  previous  experience  and  context-sensitive  learning.  This  means  that 
specific neural networks, currently in a particular state because the organism 
has  previously  encountered  a  particular  stimulus  or  environment,  or  has 
a particular history, determine ongoing processes that lead to top-down syn-
aptic inhibition (a modulation of connections) anticipating further processing 
consistent with prior processing. Such inhibitory patterns constitute a predic-
tion which is then matched against ongoing sensory input. If there is a mis-
match, i.e., if the new stimulus generates a different firing pattern than the 
one anticipated, prediction errors are sent back up the line and the system 
adjusts dynamically back and forth until there is a relatively good fit. So on 
the predictive coding model, this or something like this is going on when we 
perceive the world.  
If that’s the case, if these are the kinds of things that are happening in the 
brain, it’s not clear that we need to think of it as a kind of inference rather 
than a kind of dynamic adjustment process in which the brain, as part of and 
along with the larger organism, settles into the right kind of attunement with 
the environment—an environment that is physical but also social and cultural 
(Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014). 
Whether or not we should think that beliefs, values, as well as affective states 
and perspectives can shape the way that one quite literally sees the world, or 
can  enter  into subpersonal processes  in  terms  of  predictive  coding  models 
(Stapleton 2013), it remains an open question about how the neural (synaptic-
inhibitory)  processes  described  by  such  models  are  best  characterized—
whether as inferential (e.g., Hohwy 2013), or as part of a dynamical attune-Making enactivism even more embodied 
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ment of organism to environment, and/or in terms of plasticity where senso-
ry-motor neurons  have  become attuned by  associative  processes  and prior 
experience. In any case, on the enactive view, the explanatory unit of percep-
tion (or cognition, or action, etc.) is not the brain, or even two (or more) brains 
in  the case  of  social cognition, but a dynamic  relation between  organisms, 
which include brains, but also their own structural embodied features that 
enable  specific  perception-action  loops  involving  social  and  physical  envi-
ronments, which in turn effect statistical regularities that shape the structure 
and function of the nervous system.  
The question is, what do brains do as part of a dynamical attunement of or-
ganism to environment in the complex mix of transactions that involve mov-
ing, gesturing, and interacting with the expressive bodies of others, with their 
eyes and faces and hands and voices; bodies that are gendered and raced, and 
dressed to attract, or to work or play; bodies that incorporate artifacts, tools, 
and technologies, that are situated in various physical environments, and de-
fined by diverse social roles and institutional practices? 
Di Paolo and De Jaegher (2012) have proposed the Interactive Brain Hypothe-
sis in order to help model the possible relations between social interaction 
and neural processes. “The hypothesis states that interactive experience and 
skills play enabling roles in both the development and current function of 
social brain mechanisms, even in cases where social understanding happens 
in the absence of immediate interaction” (p. 1). We can extend this idea be-
yond the intersubjective context by following the suggestion that the brain is 
primarily and more generally an organ of relation (Fuchs 2011). Evan Thomp-
son (2014) provides a good analogy to indicate that the mind is relational, and 
that the brain plays its part in that relationality. Saying that cognition is in the 
brain is like saying that flight is inside the wings of a bird. But just as flight 
doesn’t exist if there is just a wing, without the rest of the bird, and without an 
atmosphere to support the process, and without the precise mode of organ-
ism-environment coupling  to make  it  possible,  so  cognition  doesn’t  exist  if 
there is just a brain without bodily and worldly factors. Can this way of think-
ing be made consistent with predictive coding models? 
Barrett and Bar’s affective prediction hypothesis suggests a positive answer. On 
their predictive coding model “responses signaling an object’s salience, rele-
vance or value do not occur as a separate step after the object is identified. 
Instead, affective responses support vision from the very moment that visual 
stimulation begins” (Barrett and Bar, 2009, p. 1325). At the earliest point of 
visual processing, the medial orbital frontal cortex is also activated initiating 
a train of muscular and hormonal changes throughout the body, “interocep-
tive sensations” from organs, muscles, and joints associated with prior experi-
ence,  and  integrated  with  current  exteroceptive  sensory  information  that 
helps to guide response and subsequent actions. In this respect, perceiving the AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
243 
 
environment involves not just a set of neurons firing in the brain, but also 
undergoing certain bodily affective changes that accompany this integrated 
processing.  Before  we  consciously  recognize  an object  or  other  person,  for 
what it or he or she is, our bodies are already configured into overall periph-
eral and autonomic patterns based on prior associations. In terms of the pre-
dictive coding model used by Barrett and Bar, priors, that include affect, are 
not just in the brain, but involve a whole body adjustment to the environmen-
tal stimulus. 
This suggests that the brain participates in a system, along with eyes and face 
and hands and voice, and so on. And the brain would work differently if its 
embodiment lacked eyes, face, hands, voice, and so on. This is a fully embod-
ied system that enactively anticipates and responds to its environment. How 
an agent responds and what an agent perceives will depend to a great degree 
on the overall dynamical state of the brain, but also on environmental factors, 
embodied affective and intersubjective factors, the person(s) with whom she 
is interacting, her worldly and intentional circumstances, the bodily skills and 
habits she has formed, her physical condition, as well as her history of per-
sonal experiences, and what the other person may expect in terms of norma-
tive  standards  stemming  from  communal  and  institutional  practices  (Gal-
lagher et al. 2013). Change any of these things and we can expect changes in 
neural  processing,  not  because  the  brain  represents  such  changes  and  re-
sponds to them in central command mode, but because the brain is part of the 
larger embodied system that is coping with its changing environment.  
 
Conclusion 
We’ve argued that it’s not enough to model an enactivist approach to percep-
tion and cognition on sensorimotor contingencies alone, even if they do play 
an important role in such matters. There is good evidence that affective and 
intersubjective aspects  of  embodiment  are  also  important contributories  to 
perceptual and cognitive processes. In addition, this realization pushes us to 
re-think the role played by neuronal processes in the brain. Even a neurosci-
ence that frames brain function in terms of predictive coding needs to recog-
nize that the brain is part of a system that attunes to and responds to its envi-
ronment  in  a  way  that  enacts  a  meaning  relative  to  the  particularities  of 
its embodiment. 
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